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Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG
1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of 
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, 
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according 
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by 
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report 
contains   among   others   the   certificate   (summarised   assessment)   and   the   detailed 
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of 
the  certified   product,  the   details  of the   evaluation  (strength  and   weaknesses)  and 
instructions for the user.
1 Act   setting  up   the   Federal  Office   for  Information   Security  (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz,   BSIG)   of   17 
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the 
following:
● BSIG
2
● BSI Certification Ordinance
3
● BSI Schedule of Costs
4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the 
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1
5 [1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual 
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or 
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The   SOGIS-Mutual   Recognition  Agreement   (MRA)   for   certificates   based   on   ITSEC 
became initially effective in March 1998. 
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April 
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance 
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates 
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The 
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement. 
2 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security 
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of  07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 
May 2006, p. 3730
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The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the 
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of 
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has 
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles 
based on the CC. 
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes 
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates 
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement. 
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a 
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Version 4.3 CP03 has undergone the 
certification procedure at BSI. 
The evaluation of the product JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Version 4.3 CP03 was 
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 30. April 
2009. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)
6 recognised 
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Red Hat
The product was developed by: Red Hat
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this 
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The 
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the 
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following 
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at 
the end of the Certification Report.
6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target 
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the 
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required 
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance 
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to 
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. 
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural 
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Version 4.3 CP03 has been included in 
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// 
www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 
9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer
7 of the 
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet 
address stated above.
7 Varsity Drive
Raleigh, NC 27606
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B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the JBoss Enterprise Application Platform which 
implements an application server. JBoss is based on Java Enterprise Edition (J2EE) and 
therefore supports a large variety of operating systems. As an application server, JBoss 
allows client computers or devices to access applications. Access to these applications is 
possible through different network protocols, such as HTTP, EJBs, and others. JBoss 
handles the business logic of the application, including accessing and providing the user 
data required by the application.
The TOE is defined as a stand-alone JBoss instance. If a cluster of JBoss nodes is 
defined, then the entire cluster is considered to be one TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified 
Protection Profile. 
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance 
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). 
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2 
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the 
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are  selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some 
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE 
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Access Control - covering the objects of URLs, EJB methods, message queues and topics
Audit - covering the access control decisions
Clustering - ensuring the consistency of user and TSF data between cluster nodes
Identification and 
Authentication
- ensuring the proper identification and authentication of users to facilitate the 
various access control mechanisms
Transaction Rollback  - ensuring data consistency for user and TSF data
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2. 
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, 
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], 
chapter 3. 
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: 
● Enterprise Application Platform JBoss 4.3 CP03
● additional patch jbeap-4.3.0.GA_CP03_CVE-2009-0027
The TOE is allowed to be executed on all Java Virtual Machine Runtime Environments 
listed in the ST.
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The TOE is allowed to be executed with Java Security Manager disabled. If it is enabled, 
the policy provided with the TOE must be utilized as outlined in the CC guidance 
documentation.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating 
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and 
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate 
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification 
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for 
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this 
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that 
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Version 4.3 CP03
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Enterprise Application Platform JBoss 
4.3 CP03 with the additional patch 
jbeap-4.3.0.GA_CP03_CVE-2009-0027
CP03 with the additional patch 
jbeap-4.3.0.GA_CP03_CVE-
2009-0027
Download (ZIP 
archive or RPM 
archive)
2 DOC CC Guide V 1.0, 16.04.09 Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE and its documentation (especially the CC configuration guide acting as the 
central guidance document covering the different aspects of the evaluated configuration of 
the TOE) are supplied via the Red Hat Network web site ( for RPM files) and the Customer 
Services Portal (CSP) ( for zip-files) allowing a download of electronic copies of the TOE. 
Updates are also delivered through the Red Hat Network.
The integrity and authenticity of the electronic copies are ensured by using cryptographic 
signatures.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and 
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: 
● Security Audit
● User Data Protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Protection of the TSF
Further details can be found in chapter 6 of [6].
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and 
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to 
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are 
of relevance: OE.ADMIN, OE.SYSTEM, OE.INSTALL, OE.PHYSICAL, OE.RECOVER and 
OE.DEVEL. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is the JBoss Enterprise Application Platform which implements an application 
server. JBoss is based on Java Enterprise Edition (J2EE) and therefore supports a large 
variety of operating systems. As an application server, JBoss allows client computers or 
devices to access applications. Access to these applications is possible through different 
network protocols, such as HTTP, EJBs, and others. JBoss handles the business logic of 
the   application,   including   accessing   and   providing   the   user   data   required   by   the 
application.
JBoss is written entirely in Java and provides a J2EE-compliant environment which is 
consistent with the J2EE 1.4 specification as defined by SUN Microsystems. Depending on 
the configuration of the JBoss server, components required by the J2EE specification can 
be disabled. The applications developed for and served by JBoss are to be written in Java.
Developers of the Java application implement the business logic and are free to utilize the 
supporting functionality of J2EE.
The primary security features of the TOE are:
● Access Control covering the objects of URLs, EJB methods, message queues and 
topics
● Audit covering the access control decisions
● Clustering ensuring the consistency of user and TSF data between cluster nodes
● Identification and Authentication ensuring the proper identification and authentication of 
users to facilitate the various access control mechanisms
● Transaction Rollback ensuring data consistency for user and TSF data
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to 
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of 
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of 
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
Test configuration
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The   tests   on   the   TOE   were   performed   several   times   with   different   configuration 
constraints. The following constraints were considered by the developer:
● Both modes of operation allowed in the ST (Java Security Manager with its well-defined 
policy both enabled and disabled) were covered with testing.
● All Java Runtime Environments specified in the ST were subject to testing.
● All user account data stores allowed in the ST were covered with tests.
● The Oracle database was used as a database backend.
Testing has been performed on the TOE version considering CC guidance. The CC 
guidance with the specification of the evaluated configuration contains few additional 
configuration requirements besides the documentation of loading the security policy for the 
Java Security Manager. These additional configurations were applied by the tester. 
Therefore, the testing configuration meets the configuration requirements for the evaluated 
configuration.
Testing results
The test results provided by the developer were generated on the JRE platforms and 
configurations listed above. All test results from all tested configurations show that the 
expected test results are consistent with the actual results.
The evaluator analyzed the developer testing coverage by reviewing all test cases. The 
evaluator found that the testing of the TSF is extensive and covers most of the TSFI as 
identified in the functional specification. The evaluator reviewed the test results provided 
by the sponsor and found them to be consistent with the test plan.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
TOE test configuration
The evaluator independently installed the TOE according to the documentation in the CC 
guidance and the general installation guidance. The test cases are prepared as outlined in 
the test plan documentation. As assessed in the evaluation report on the guidance, the CC 
guide is consistent with the ST. Therefore, the evaluator concludes that the evaluator's 
configuration is consistent with the ST. The following system configurations have been 
applied:
● SUN JRE 1.5
● Security Manager enabled for one test run and disabled for a second test run
● Local file-based user definition
Summary of evaluator test results
The evaluator testing effort consisted of two parts: the first is the observation of the 
developer test execution, and the second is the execution of the tests created by the 
evaluator. The test system was set up as specified above. When re-running the developer 
testing using the test-cc test scenario, the evaluator observed the developer test plan to 
set up and initiate these tests. The test result file shows pass for all executed test cases.
In addition to running the developer tests, the evaluator devised independent tests. These 
tests cover the following functional areas:
14 / 34BSI-DSZ-CC-0531-2009 Certification Report
● Auditing: different tests were executed covering different functional areas of the TOE to 
verify that appropriate audit records are created and maintained by the TOE for the 
access requests.
All tests passed successfully.
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
Testing approach
The evaluator took the following approach to derive penetration tests for the TOE: First the 
evaluator checked common sources for vulnerabilities of the JBoss server in general and 
the TOE in particular. The evaluator determined:
● if the reported vulnerability would affect the evaluated configuration of the TOE in its 
intended environment. If yes, the evaluator performed a vulnerability analysis.
● if the reported vulnerability has already been fixed in the evaluated configuration of the 
TOE. If there were any which had not been fixed, the evaluator would have analyzed 
the potential impact and exploitability.
Beside those vulnerabilities reported in common sources, the evaluator checked other 
evaluation reports for potential vulnerabilities mentioned within those reports. For those 
vulnerabilities, the evaluator devised the way to check for the existence or absence of 
such a hypothetical vulnerability, taking into account that the TOE is an Open Source 
product and so the evaluator had full access to the source code.
Test results
The penetration testing addressed the following security functionalities:
● Non-bypassibility of TOE security functions
No vulnerability was detected.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Enterprise Application Platform JBoss 4.3 CP03
● additional patch jbeap-4.3.0.GA_CP03_CVE-2009-0027
The TOE is allowed to be executed on all Java Virtual Machine Runtime Environments 
listed in the ST.
The TOE is allowed to be executed with Java Security Manager disabled. If it is enabled, 
the policy provided with the TOE must be utilized as outlined in the CC guidance 
documentation.
For further details refer to [6], section 1.4.4. 
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the 
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all 
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
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The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance 
components: 
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC 
(see also part C of this report)
● The component ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality:  Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance:  Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 2 augmented by 
ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and 
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the 
assessment.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the 
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. 
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is 
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for 
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EJB  Enterprise JavaBeans
HTTP  Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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J2EE  See Java EE
Java EE  Java Enterprise Edition
JRE  Java Runtime Environment
JVM  Java Virtual Machine
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
VM Virtual Machine
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Authentication data - Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorised user - A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Class - A grouping of families that share a common focus.
Component - The smallest selectable set of elements that may be included in a PP, an 
ST, or a package.
Connectivity - The property of the TOE which allows interaction with IT entities external to 
the TOE. This includes exchange of data by wire or by wireless means, over any distance 
in any environment or configuration.
Dependency  - A relationship between requirements such that the requirement that is 
depended upon must normally be satisfied for the other requirements to be able to meet 
their objectives.
Element - An indivisible security requirement.
Evaluation - Assessment of a PP, an ST or a TOE, against defined criteria.
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) - A package consisting of assurance components 
from Part 3 that represents a point on the CC predefined assurance scale.
Evaluation authority - A body that implements the CC for a specific community by means 
of an evaluation scheme and thereby sets the standards and monitors the quality of 
evaluations conducted by bodies within that community.
Evaluation scheme - The administrative and regulatory framework under which the CC is 
applied by an evaluation authority within a specific community
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
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External IT entity - Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE that 
interacts with the TOE.
Family  - A grouping of components that share security objectives but may differ in 
emphasis or rigour.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Human user - Any person who interacts with the TOE.
Identity - A representation (e.g. a string) uniquely identifying an authorised user, which can 
either be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon 
which subjects perform operations.
Organisational security policies - One or more security rules, procedures, practices, or 
guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations.
Package - A reusable set of either functional or assurance components (e.g. an EAL), 
combined together to satisfy a set of identified security objectives.
Product  - A package of IT software, firmware and/or hardware, providing functionality 
designed for use or incorporation within a multiplicity of systems.
Protection Profile  - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a 
TOE type.
Reference monitor  - The concept of an abstract machine that enforces TOE access 
control policies.
Reference validation mechanism  - An implementation of the reference monitor concept 
that possesses the following properties: it is tamperproof, always invoked, and simple 
enough to be subjected to thorough analysis and testing. 
Refinement - The addition of details to a component.
Role - A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and 
the TOE.
Secret - Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order 
to enforce a specific SFP.
Security Function (SF)  - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for 
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Function Policy (SFP) - The security policy enforced by an SF.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific 
identified TOE.
Security attribute - Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used 
for the enforcement of the TSP.
Security objective  - A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy 
identified organisation security policies and assumptions.
Selection - The specification of one or more items from a list in a component.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
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Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
System - A specific IT installation, with a particular purpose and operational environment.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)  - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and 
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
TOE Security Functions Interface (TSFI) - A set of interfaces, whether interactive (man-
machine interface) or programmatic (application programming interface), through which 
TOE resources are accessed, mediated by the TSF, or information is obtained from the 
TSF.
TOE Security Policy (TSP)  - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, 
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TOE resource - Anything usable or consumable in the TOE.
TOE security policy model  - A structured representation of the security policy to be 
enforced by the TOE.
TSF Scope of Control (TSC) - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE 
and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
TSF data - Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied 
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of 
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
Transfers outside TSF control - Communicating data to entities not under control of the 
TSF.
Trusted channel  - A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can 
communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP.
Trusted path - A means by which a user and a TSF can communicate with necessary 
confidence to support the TSP.
User - Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the 
TOE.
User data - Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met 
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC 
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP 
or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that 
PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP 
or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that 
PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to 
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. 
EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one 
additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one 
additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the 
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of 
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection 
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the 
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which 
PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on 
this Conformance Statement, see Annex A.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, 
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct 
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be 
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction 
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims 
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition 
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment  
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives 
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition 
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements 
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements 
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition” 
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally 
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a 
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the 
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction 
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims 
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition 
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment  
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives 
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition 
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements 
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements 
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification 
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design 
summary 
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition 
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance 
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decompositon.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description 
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with 
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with 
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD: 
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and 
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability 
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the 
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of 
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at 
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use 
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in 
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable 
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered 
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically 
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the 
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels 
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered 
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in 
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher 
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, 
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance 
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described 
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one 
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component 
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of 
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance 
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution 
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the 
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only 
EALs   may  be   augmented.  The   notion  of   an   “EAL  minus   a   constituent   assurance 
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with 
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the 
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended 
assurance requirements.
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Assurance 
Class
Assurance 
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance 
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle 
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target 
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability 
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats 
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is 
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the 
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the 
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through 
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including 
independent   testing   against   a   specification,   and   an   examination   of   the   guidance 
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully 
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner 
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design 
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the 
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a 
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a 
low  to   moderate   level   of  independently assured   security  in   the  absence   of  ready 
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing 
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive 
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound 
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate 
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE 
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed 
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering 
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require 
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at 
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a 
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs 
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based 
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of 
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and 
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs 
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the 
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a 
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a 
rigorous   development  approach   without  incurring   unreasonable   costs   attributable   to 
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested 
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering 
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for 
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high 
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation   assurance   level   7   (EAL7)   -   formally   verified   design   and   tested  
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high 
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical 
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality 
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The  AVA:   Vulnerability   assessment   class   addresses   the   possibility   of   exploitable 
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities 
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE 
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the 
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate 
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws 
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere 
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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